Balfour

Brandeis and his associates found the draft unsatisfactory in two particulars.
They disliked that part of the draft’s second safeguard clause which read, “by
such Jew`s who are fully contented with their existing nationality and
citizenship,” and substituted “the rights and civil political status enjoyed by
Jews in any country. In addition, Brandeis apparently proposed the change of
“Jewish race” to “Jewish people.” [172] Jacob de Haas, then Executive
Secretary of the Provisional Zionist Committee, has written that the pressure to
issue the declaration was coming from the English Zionist leaders: “they
apparently needed it to stabilize their position against local anti-Zionism. If
American Zionists were anxious about it, Washington would act.” De Haas
continues:

Then one morning Baron Furness, one of England’s unostentatious
representatives, brought to 44 East 23rd Street, at that time headquarters of the
Zionist Organization, the final draft ready for issue. The language of the
declaration accepted by the English Zionists based as it was on the theory of
discontent was unacceptable to me. I informed Justice Brandeis of my views,
called in Dr. Schmarya Levin and proceeded to change the text. Then with Dr.
Wise, I hurried to Colonel House. By this time he had come to speak of Zionisn
as “our cause.” Quietly he perused my proposed change, discussed its wisdom
and promised to call President Wilson on his private wire and urge the change.
He cabled to the British Cabinet. Next day he informed me that the President had
approved. I had business that week-end in Boston and it was over the long
distance wire that my secretary in New York read to me the final form as
repeated by cable from London. It was the text as I had altered it.[173]
“It seems clear,” wrote Stein, “that .it was not without some prompting by House
that Wilson eventually authorized a favourable reply to the British enquiry.” Sir
William Wiseman, “who was persona grata both with the President and with
House, was relied upon by the Foreign Office for dealing with the declaration at
the American end. Sir William’s recollection is that Colonel House was influential
in bringing the matter to the President’s attention and persuading him to
approve the formula.” [174]

On 16 October 1917, after a conference with House, Wiseman telegraphed to
Balfour’s private secretary: ”Colonel House put the formula before the President
who approves of it but asks that no mention of his approval shall be made when
His Majesty’s Government makes formula public, as he had arranged the
American Jews shall then ask him for approval, which he will publicly give
here.”[175]

The Balfour Declaration, as stated, was issued on 2 November 1917. Its text,
seemingly so simple, had been prepared by some the craftiest of the craft of
legal drafting. Leaflets containing its message were dropped by air on Germany
and Austria and on the Jewish belt from Poland to the Baltic Sea.
Seven months had passed since America entered the war. It was an epochal
triumph for Zionism, and some believe, for the Jews.
On the other hand, two months before the declaration, Sokolow had written of a
marked falling off in “le philo-sémitisme d’autrefois,” ascribed by some to the
impression that the Russian Jews were the mainspring of Bolshevism; and on
the day it was issued, The Jewish Chronicle complained of “the antisemitic
campaign which a section of the press in this country, indifferent to the national
interests, is sedulously conducting.” [176] There only remained certain
courtesies to be effected. On November 1917, Weizmann wrote a letter of thanks
to Brandeis:

“… I need hardly say how we all rejoice in this great event and how grateful
we all feel to you for the valuable and efficient help which you have lent to the
cause in the critical hour … Once more, dear Mr. Brandeis, I beg to tender to you
our heartiest congratulations not only on my own behalf but also on behalf of
our friends here — and may this epoch-making be a beginning of great work for
our sorely tried people and also of mankind.” [177]
The other principal Allied governments were approached with requests for
similar pronouncements. The French simply supported the British Government
in a short paragraph on 9 February 1918. Italian support was contained in a note
dated 9 May 1918 to Mr, Sokolow by their ambassador in London in which he
stressed the religious divisions of communities, grouping “a Jewish national
centre” with existing religious communities.”

On 31, August 1918, President Wilson wrote to Rabbi Wise “to express the
satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the Zionist movement . . since … Great
Britain s approval of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
Jewish people.” Brandeis joined in Zionist delight at the President’s
endorsement and wrote: “Since the President’s letter, anti-Zionism is pretty near
disloyalty and non-Zionism is slackening.” [178] Non-Zionist Jews now had a hard
time if they wanted to disseminate their views; if they could not support Zionism
they were asked at least to remain silent.
On 30 June 1922, the following resolution was adopted by the United States
Congress:

Favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people;

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled. That the United States of America
favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,
it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which should prejudice
the civil and religious rights of Christians and all other non-Jewish communities
in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in
Palestine shall be adequately protected.[J]

All people tend to see the world and its events in terms of their own
experience, ideas and prejudices. This is natural. It is a fact used by master
politicians and manipulators of opinion who form their appeals accordingly. The
case of the Balfour Declaration is a fascinating example of a scheme presenting
a multiplicity of images according to the facet of mind on which it reflected.
There were critics of the Balfour Declaration, although among the cacophony of
many events competing for attention, few but its beneficiaries concentrated on
the significance of what was being offered. One was the Jewish leader and
statesman Mr. Edwin Montagu, who had no desire that Jews should be regarded
as a separate race and a distinct nationality.[181] The other was Lord Curzon,
who became Foreign Secretary at the end of October 1918. He prepared a
memorandum dated 26 October 1917, on the penultimate and final drafts of the
Balfour Declaration and related documents, and circulated it in the Cabinet. It
was titled “The Future of Palestine.” Here are some extracts:

I am not concerned to discuss the question in dispute between the Zionist
and anti-Zionist jews . I am only concerned in the more immediately practical
questions:

(a) What is the meaning of the phrase “a national home for the Jewish race in
Palestine,” and what is the nature of the obligation that we shall assume if we
accept this as a principle of British policy?

(b) If such a policy be pursued what are the chances of its successful
realisation?
If I seek guidance from the latest collection of circulated papers (The Zionist
Movement, G.-164) I find a fundamental disagreement among the authorities
quoted there as to the scope and nature of their aim.

A “national home for the Jewish race or people” would seem, if the words are
to bear their ordinary meaning, to imply a place where the Jews can be
reassembled as a nation, and where they will enjoy the privileges of an
independent national existence. Such is clearly the conception of those who,
like Sir Alfred Mond, speak of the creation in Palestine of “an autonomous
Jewish State,” words which appear to contemplate a State, i.e., a political entity,
composed of Jews, governed by Jews, and administered mainly in the interests
of Jews…

The same conception appears to underlie several other of the phrases
employed in these papers, e.g., when we are told that Palestine is to become “a
home for the Jewish nation,” “a national home for the Jewish race,” “a Jewish
Palestine,” and when we read of “the resettlement of Palestine as a national
centre,” and “the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people,” all these
phrases are variants of the same idea, viz., the re-creation of Palestine as it was
before the days of the dispersion.

On the other hand, Lord Rothschild, when he speaks of Palestine as “a home
where the Jews could speak their own language, have their own education,
their own civilization, and religious institutions under the protection of Allied
governments,” seems to postulate a much less definite form of political
existence, one, indeed, which is quite compatible with the existence of an alien
(so long as it is not Turkish) government…

Now what is the capacity as regards population of Palestine within any
reasonable period of time? Under the Turks there is no such place or country as
Palestine, because it is divided up between the sanjak of Jerusalem and the
vilayets of Syria and Beirut. But let us assume that in speaking of Palestine in
the present context we mean the old scriptural Palestine, extending from Dan to
Beersheba, i.e., from Banias to Bir es-Sabi… . an area of less than 10,000 square
miles. What is to become of the people of this country, assuming the Turk to be
expelled, and the inhabitants not to have been exterminated by the war? There
are over a half a million of these, Syrian Arabs — a mixed community with Arab,
Hebrew, Canaanite, Greek, Egyptian, and possibly Crusaders’ blood. They and
their forefathers have occupied the country for the best part of 1,500 years.
They own the soil, which belongs either to individual landowners or to village
communities. They profess the Mohammadan faith. They will not be content
either to be expropriated for Jewish immigrants, or to act merely as hewers of
wood and drawers of water to the latter.

A. Born in Rumania in 1856, his imposing presence and scholarship combined
with “an oracular manner suggesting that he had access to mysteries hidden
from others, had made him an important figure at Zionist Congresses and on
Zionist platforms in England and abroad.” It was calculated that Sykes would be
impressed by his personality and background.[116]

B. These included the socialist leader, Jules Cuesde, who had joined Viviani’s
National Government as Minister of State; Gustave Herve: the publicist and
future Minister de Monzie; and others.

C. Privately, Sokolow resented Malcolm as “a stranger in the center of our
work,” who was “endowed with an esprit of a goyish kind. ” [130]

D. Of Jewish extraction.[131]

E. The French note represented a defeat for the “Syrian Party” in the
government who believed in French dominion over the entire area. This was not
only due to the strong representations of Sykes on behalf of his Government,
but was assisted by those of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, [132] who prevailed
upon the Alliance Israélite to back the Zionist cause.
The result of the no less successful conversations in Rome and the Vatican
were cabled to the Zionist Organization over British controlled lines.[133]

F. The use of the term “National Home” was a continuation of the euphemism
deliberately adopted since the first Zionist Congress, when the term
“Heimstaette” was used instead of any of the possible German words signifying
“state.” At that time, its purpose was to avoid provoking the hostility of
non-Zionist Jews.[151]
The author or inventor of the term ”Heimstaette” was Max Nordau who coined it
”to deceive by its mildness ” until such time as ”there was no reason to
dssimulate our real aim.” [152]
The Arabic translation of ”National Home” ignores the intended subtlety, and the
words employed: watan, qawm, and sha’b, are much stronger in meaning than an
abstract notion of government.[153]

G. (1879-1924). His father, the first Lord Swaythling, and Herbert Samuel’s
father were brothers.

H. Rufus Isaacs, a Jewish lawyer, who had quickly risen to fame in his
profession, and then in politics. This was a period when elevations to the
peerage for political and financial assistance to the party in power were so
numerous that the whole system of British peerage was weakened. In 1916,
Isaacs was a viscount; in 1917 an earl.

I. Joined Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in 1921. and was responsible for their liaison with
London banks, and was “in charge of financing several large enterprises.” [160]

J. This was introduced by Mr. Hamilton Fish. His interpretation of his action
was clarified thirty-eight years later, when the World Zionists held their 25th
Congress in Jerusalem. David Ben Gurion, as Prime Minister of Israel, in his
address to the gathering stated: “every religious Jew has daily violated the
precepts of Judaism by remaining in the diaspora”; and, citing the authority of
the Jewish sages, said: “Whoever dwells outside the land of Israel is
considered to have no god.” He added: “Judaism is in danger of death by
strangulation. In the free and prosperous countries it faces the kiss of death, a
slow and imperceptible decline into the abyss of assimilation.” [179]

Mr. Hamilton Fish replied: “As author of the first Zionist Resolution patterned
on the Balfour Resolution, I denounce and repudiate the Ben Gurion statements
as irreconcilable with my Resolution as adopted by Congress, and if they
represent the Government of Israel and public opinion there, then I shall
disavow publicly my support of my own Resolution, as I do not want to be
associated with such un-American doctrines.”[180]

Wilson and the War
If the contract with Jewry was to bring the United States into the Great War in
exchange for the promise of Palestine, did they in fact deliver, through Brandeis
or anyone else?

For the German-Jewish princes of the purse in the United States, the
evidence points more to the Russian revolution being the factor of most weight
in determining their attitude.

Was it the resumption of Germany’s submarine blockade, the sinking of the
Laconia, the Zimmerman telegram, which really influenced Wilson for war? Was it
the Zionist counsel of Brandeis? In a careful study, Prof. Alex M. Arnett showed
in 1937 that Wilson had decided to put the United States into the war on the side
of the Allies many months before the resumption of U-boat warfare by Germany,
which was promoted as a sufficient reason.[182]

In the propaganda battle for American public opinion between Britain and
Germany, the former had the advantage of language, and the fact that on 5
August 1914 they had cut the international undersea cables linking Germany and
the United States, thus eliminating quick communication between those two
countries and giving British “news” the edge in forming public opinion.
The success of British propaganda methods were acknowledged by a German
soldier of the time when he dictated his memoirs, Mein Kampf, in 1925: “In
England propaganda was regarded as a weapon of the first order, whereas with
us it represented the last hope of a livelihood for our unemployed politicians
and a snug job for shirkers of the modest heroic type. Taken all in all, its results
were negative.”

British propaganda portrayed the war as one of just defense against a
barbarian aggressor akin to the hordes of Genghis Khan, who were rapers of
nuns, mutilators of children, led by the Kaiser — pictured as a beast in human
form, a lunatic, deformed monster, modern Judas, and criminal monarch.
Stories that German soldiers cut off the hands of Belgian children and crucified
prisoners and perpetrated and all sorts of other atrocities said to have been
practiced in Belgium, were circulated as widely as possible. The story about
their making glycerine and soap from corpses did not appear until the end of
April 1917, when new stories were created by American propagandists. One, a
book called Christine, by “Alice Cholmondeley,” a collection of letters purporting
to have been written by a teenage girl music student to her mother in Britain
until her death in 1914, mingled a damning catalogue of alleged German
character faults with emotional feelings for her fictitious mother and music.
Propaganda experts rated it highly.[183]

The head of the American section of the British propaganda bureau, Sir
Gilbert Parker, was able to report on his Success in the issue of his secret
Americon Press Review for 11 October 1916 before the Presidential election:
”This week supplies satisfactory evidence of the permeation of the American
Press by British influence.”

Men of British ancestry still dominated the powerful infrastructure of the
economy, filled top Positions in the State Department in the influential Eastern
universities, in the communications and cultural media. Britain and France were
more identified with democracy and freedom, and the Central Powers with
imperial militaristic autocracy. From Oyster Bay, former President Theodore
Roosevelt, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, performed high-pitched war
dances of words in support of belligerency.

But at the Democratic convention, and in the subsequent campaign, it was
William Jennings Bryan and his allied orators who created the theme and slogan:
“He kept us out of war.”

Bryan had resigned as Secretary of State in June 1915 because he believed
Wilson was jeopardizing American neutrality and showing partiality towards
England. In his last interview, he told Wilson bitterly, “Colonel House has been
Secretary of State, not I, and I have never had your full confidence.”
House, a secretive and subtle flatterer who had performed services relating to
the Federal Reserve Bank and currency legislation for Jacob W. Schiff and Paul
Warburg, was perceived by Wilson as the “friend who so thoroughly
understands me,” “my second personality….my independent self, His thoughts
and mine are one.”

Bryan had wanted to go on a peace mission to Europe at the beginning of
1915, but the President sent House instead. House had actually sailed on the
British ship Lusitania and as it approached the Irish coast on 5 February, the
captain ordered the American flag to be raised.

The Intimate Papers of Colonel House record that on the morning of 7 May
1915, he and the British Foreign Secretary Grey drove to Kew. “We spoke of the
probability of an ocean liner being sunk,” recorded House, “and I told him if this
were done, a flame of indignation would sweep across America, which would in
itself probably carry us into the war.” An hour later, House was with King George
in Buckingham Palace. “We fell to talking, strangely enough,” the Colonel wrote
that night, ”of the probability of Germany sinking a trans-Atlantic liner… ” He
said, “Suppose they should sink the Lusitania with American passengers on
board… “

That evening House dined at the American Embassy. A dispatch came in,
stating that at two in the afternoon a German submarine had torpedoed and
sunk the Lusitania off the southern coast of Ireland. 1,200 lives were lost,
including 128 Americans. It took 60 years for the truth about its cargo to be
confirmed; that it had carried munitions which exploded when the torpedo hit.
But Secretary of State Bryan remarked to his wife, “I wonder if that ship carried
munitions of war… . If she did carry them, it puts a different face on the whole
matter! England has been using our citizens to protect her ammunition.”
In a telegram to President Wilson from England on 9 May 1915, House said he
believed an immediate demand should made to Germany for assurance against a
similar incident.

I should inform her that our Government expected to take measures … to
ensure the safety of American citizens.
If war follows, it will not be a new war, but an endeavor to end more speedily an
old one. Our intervention will save, rather than increase loss of life. We can no
longer be neutral spectators .

In another telegram on 25 May, he noted that he had received from
Ambassador Gerard a cable that Germany is in no need of food. “This does away
with their contention that the starving of Germany justified their submarine
policy.”

The next day, House lunched with Sir Edward Grey and read him all the
telegrams that had passed between the President, Gerard and himself since last
they had met. And he wrote on 30 May 1915, “I have concluded that war with
Germany is inevitable, and this afternoon at six o’clock I decided to go home on
the S.S. St. Paul on Saturday. I sent a cable to the President to this effect.” After
his arrival in the United States, he wrote to the President from Rosslyn, Long
Island, on 16 June 1915, a long letter which included the paragraph:
I need not tell you that if the Allies fail to win, it must necessarily mean a
reversal of our entire policy.

I think we shall find ourselves drifting into war with Germany … Regretable as
this would be, there would be compensations. The war would be more speedily
ended, and we would be in a strong position to aid the other great democracies
in turning the world into the right paths. It is something that we have to face
with fortitude, being consoled by the thought that no matter what sacrifices we
make, the end will ustify them. Affectionately yours, E.M. House.
Are these references related to Zionism or Palestine? I think not. Perhaps the
clue is that immediately after the election of Wilson, House had anonymously
publisherl a political romance entitled Philip Dru: Administrator. Dru leads a
revolt and becomes a dictator in Washington, where he formulates a new
American consitution and brings about an international grouping or league of
Powers.

Let us look to the other side of the water again in 1916, a year later.
About a month before Malcolm’s meeting with Sir Mark Sykes, Lloyd George
gave an interview to the President of the United Press Association of America,
in which he said “that Britain had only now got into her stride in her war effort,
and was justifiably suspicious of any suggestion that President Wilson should
choose this moment to ‘butt in’ with a proposal to stop the war before we could
achieve victory.”

“The whole world … must know that there can be no outside interference at
this stage. Britain asked no intervention when she was unprepared to fight. She
will tolerate none now that she is prepared, until the Prussian military despotism
is broken beyond repair… . The motto of the Allies was ‘Never Again!’ ” And this
made worthwhile the sacrifices so far as well as those needed to end the war
with victory.[184]

Grey wrote to him on the 29th of September that he was apprehensive about
the effect “of the warning to Wilson in your interview… . It has always been my
view that until the Allies were sure of victory the door should be kept open for
Wilson’s mediation.”

But the following month, at one of the formal regular meetings with the Chief
of the Imperial Staff, when Lloyd George received the familiar answers as to the
course of the war — the German losses were greater than the Allies, that the
Germans were gradually being worn down, and their morale shaken by constant
defeat and retreat — he asked Sir Wm. Robertson for his views as “to how this
sanguinary conflict was to be brought to a successful end … He just mumbled
something about ‘attrition’.”

Lloyd George then asked for a formal memorandum on the subject. This was
not encouraging, and said that an end could not be expected “before the
summer of 1918. How long it may go on afterwards I cannot even guess.”
The facts were far from rosy, but were the hopes of Great Britain really hanging
upon American entry into the war? There were two other possible courses.
One was suggested by the Marquess of Landsdowne, a member of the Cabinet
and a statesman of considerable standing as the author of the Entente Cordiale
in 1904. It was contained in a Memorandum Respecting a Peace Settlement,
circulated to the Cabinet with the consent of the Prime Minister. Landsdowne
suggested doubts as to the possibility of victory within a reasonable space of
time.

What does the prolongation of the war mean? Our own casualties already
amount to over 1,100,000. We have had 15,000 officers killed, not including
those who are missing. There is no reason to suppose that, as the force at the
front in the different theatres of war increases, the casualties will increase at a
lower rate. We are slowly but surely killing off the best of the male population of
these islands. The figures representing the casualties of our Allies are not
before me. The total must be appalling.[185]

The other members of the Cabinet and the Chief of Staff repudiated peace
without victory.

The other course was that adopted: to thrust more men and money into the
holocaust (defined as a wholesale sacrifice or destruction). What would now be
called political and military summit meetings were held in France to plan for it.
They commenced on 15 November 1916.
In the political presentations, the only reference to America seems to have been
offered by Lloyd George:

The difficulties we have experienced in making payment for our purchases
abroad must be as present to the minds of French statesmen as to ourselves.
Our dependence upon America is growing for food, raw material and munitions.
We are rapidly exhausting the securities negotiable in America. If victory shone
on our banners, our difficulties would disappear.[Asquith deleted the next
sentence, which read] Success means credit: financiers never hesitate to lend
to a prosperous concern: but business which is lumbering along amidst great
difficulties and which is making no headway in spite of enormous expenditure
will find the banks gradually closing their books against it.
This reference to Allied problems in getting more credit from the bankers in the
United States, who were predominantly German-Jewish, elucidates Schiff’s
agreement to arrange credit for Britain through the Jewish banker Cassel — they
were not waiting for a Balfour Declaration, they were waiting for the Russian
Revolution!

On the military side, there was general agreement at the summit conference
that what was needed was a ”knock-out blow,” and it was decided that the 1917
plan of campaign would be an offensive on all fronts, including Palestine, with
the Western Front as the principal one.

On 7 December the Asquith government fell and Lloyd George, who was
pledged to a more vigorous prosecution of the war, took over the Government.
Five days later, Germany and her allies put forward notes in which they stated
their willingness to consider peace by compromise and negotiations.
The first of the battles opened on 9 April 1917, heralded by a bombardment of
2,700,000 shells. Another attack was launched by the French nine days later,
these resulting in about a million dead and wounded on both sides. The French
Army mutinied, and General Petain was put in charge.

At this time the two events which were to twist the world into a new shape
were occurring, the Russian Revolution and American entry into the war.
French Government wanted to defer all offensive operations until American
assistance became available, but the generals thought otherwise. Maj.-Gen.
J.F.C. Fuller, whom I have met, one of the few bright military-political minds in
this century, tells us that Haig “had set his heart on a decisive battle in
Flanders, and so obsessed was he by it that he believed that he could beat the
Germans single-handed, and before the Americans came in.” [186] I do not think
that people who did not live in the great days of the British Empire can have a
sense of the hubris of a Haig, unless one gets it from classical literature.
Perhaps today it would be found in the head of the World Bank, from whom we
taxpayers, like the common soldiers of that time, are so far removed! There was
actually resentment in the England of my boyhood about Americans claiming to
have played any significant part in fighting the Great War.

The outcome of the grandiosity of the generals and politicians was the costly
Flanders campaign of the summer and autumn. On 7th June it was opened by
the limited and successful Battle of Messines, which was preceded by a
seventeen days’ bombardment of 3,500,000 shells, and initiated by the explosion
of nineteen mines packed with a million pounds of high explosives.
On 31st July it was followed by the Third Battle of Ypres, for which the largest
force of artillery ever seen in British history was assembled. In all, the
preliminary bombardment lasted nineteen days, and during it 4,300,000 shells,
some 107,000 tons in weight were hurled onto the prospective low lying
battlefield. Its entire surface was upheaved; all drains, dikes, culverts and roads
were destroyed, and an almost uncrossable swamp created, in which the
infantry wallowed for three and a half months. When, on 10th November, the
battle ended, the Germans had been pushed back a maximum depth of five
miles on a frontage of ten miles, at a cost of a little under 200,000 men to
themselves, and, at the lowest estimate, of 300,000 to their enemy.
Thus ended the last of the great artillery battles of attrition on the Western
Front, and when in retrospect they are looked on, it becomes understandable
why the politicians were so eager to escape them.

The Great War was like a greatly magnified version of the mutual destruction
of noble men in the Niebelungenlied. Set against each other by the vanity and
lack of vision of their rulers, the more they fought the more there was to avenge
until death delivered them from their need. “At the going down of the sun and in
the morning,” we should learn their lesson.

Britain’s Obligation?
In a memorandum marked in his own handwriting “Private & Confidential” to
Lord Peel and other members of the Royal Commission on Palestine in 1936,
James Malcolm wrote:

I have always been convinced that until the Jewish question was more or
less satisfactorily settled there could be no real or permanent peace in the
world, and that the solution lay in Palestine. This was one of the two main
considerations which impelled me, in the autumn of 1916, to initiate the
negotiations which led eventually to the Balfour Declaration and the British
Mandate for Palestine. The other, of course, was to bring America into the War.
For generations Jews and Gentiles alike have assumed in error that the cause
of Anti-Semitism was in the main religious. Indeed, the Jews in the hope of
obtaining relief from intolerance, engaged in the intensive and subversive
propagation of materialistic doctrines productive of ”Liberalism,” Socialism, and
Irreligion, resulting in de-Christianisation. On the other hand, the more
materialistic the Gentiles became, the more aware they were subconsciously
made of the cause of Anti-Semitism, which at bottom was, and remains to this
day, primarily an economic one. A French writer — Vicomte de Poncins — has
remarked that in some respects Anti-Semitism is largely a form of self-defence
against Jewish economic aggression. In my opinion, however. neither the Jews
nor the Gentiles bear the sole responsibility for this.

As I have already said, I had a part in initiating the negotiations in the early
autumn of 1916 between the British and French Governments and the Zionist
leaders, which led to the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate for
Palestine.

The first object, of course, was to enlist the very considerable and necessary
influence of the Jews, and especially of the Zionist or Nationalist Jews. to help
us bring America into the War at the most critical period of the hostilities. This
was publicly acknowledged by Mr. Lloyd George during a recent debate in the
House of Commons.

Our second object was to enable and induce Jews all the world over to
envisage constructive work as their proper field, and to take their minds off
destnictive and subversive schemes which, owing to their general Sense of
insecurity and homelessness. even in the periods preceding the French
Revolution, had provoked so much trouble and unrest in various countries, until
their ever-increasing violence culminated in the Third International and the
Russian Communist Revolution. But to achieve this end it was necessary to
promise them Palestine in consideration of their help, as already explained, and
not as a mere humanitarian experiment or enterprise, as represented in certain
quarters.

It is no wonder that Weizmann did not refer to Malcolm in his autobiography,
and Sokolow privately resented Malcolm “as a stranger in the center of our
work,” who was “endowed with an esprit of a goyish kind. ” [187]
It is also worth noting that on page seven of his memorandum Malcolm quoted
General Ludendorff, former Quartermaster General of the German Army, and
perhaps at least remembered for heading an unsuccessful coup in Munich in
1923, as saying that the Balfour Declaration was “the cleverest thing done by the
Allies in the way of propaganda and that he wished Germany had thought of it
first.”

On the other hand, might it not have provided some cold comfort for
Ludendorff to believe that the Zionist Jews were a major factor in the outcome
of the war — if that is what he is implying?

Malcolm’s belief in the Balfour Declaration as a means of bringing the United
States into the war was confirmed by Samuel Landman, secretary to the Zionist
leaders Weizmann and Sokolow, and later secretary of the World Zionist
Organization.

As the only way (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to
come into the war was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising
them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly
powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies
on a quid pro quo contract basis. Thus, as will be seen, the Zionists having
carried out their part, and greatly helped to bring America in, the Balfour
Declaration of 1917 was but the public confirmation of the necessarily secret
“gentlemens’ ” agreement of 1916, made with the previous knowledge,
acquiescence, and or approval of the Arabs, and of the British, and of the
French and other Allied governments, and not merely a voluntary, altruistic and
romantic gesture on the part of Great Britain as certain people either through
pardonable ignorance assume or unpardonable ill-will would represent or rather
misrepresent …[188]

Speaking in the House of Commons on 4 July 1922, Winston Churchill asked
rhetorically,
Are we to keep our pledge to the Zionists made in 1917…? Pledges and
promises were made during the war, and they were made, not only on the
merits, though I think the merits are considerable. They were made because it
was considered they would be of value to us in our struggle to win the war. It
was considered that the support which the Jews could give us all over the
world, and particularly in the United States, and also in Russia, would be a
definite palpable advantage. I was not responsible at that time for the giving of
those pledges, nor for the conduct of the war of which they were, when given,
an integral part. But like other members I supported the policy of the War
Cabinet. Like other members, I accepted and was proud to accept a share in
those great transactions, which left us with terrible losses, with formidable
obligations, but nevertheless with unchallengable victory.

However, Hansard notes, one member, Mr. Gwynne, plaintively complained
that “the House has not yet had an opportunity of discussing it.”
Writing to The Times on 2 November 1949, Malcolm Thomson, the official
biographer of Lloyd George, noted that this was the thirty-second anniversary of
the Balfour Declaration and it seemed a
suitable occasion for stating briefly certain facts about its origin which have
recently been incorrectly recorded.

When writing the official biography of Lloyd George, I was able to study the
original documents bearing on this question. From these it was clear that
although certain members of the Cabinets of 1916 and 1917 sympathized with
Zionist aspirations, the efforts of Zionist leaders to win any promise of support
from the British Government had proved quite ineffectual, and the secret
Sykes-Picot agreement with the French for partition of spheres of interest in the
Middle East seemed to doom Zionist aims. A change of attitude was, however,
brought about through the initiative of Mr. James A. Malcolm, who pressed on
Sir Mark Sykes, then Under-Secretary to the War Cabinet, the thesis that an
allied offer to restore Palestine to the Jews would swing over from the German
to the allied side the very powerful influence of American Jews, including Judge
Brandeis, the friend and adviser of President Wilson. Sykes was interested, and
at his request Malcolm introduced him to Dr. Weizmann and the other Zionist
leaders, and negotiations were opened which culminated in the Balfour
Declaration.

These facts have at one time or another been mentioned in various books
and articles, and are set out by Dr. Adolf Boehm in his monumental history of
Zionism, “Die Zionistische Bewegung,” Vol. 1, p.656. It therefore surprised me to
find in Dr. Weizmann’s autobiography, “Trial and Error,” that he makes no
mention of Mr. Malcolm’s crucially important intervention, and even attributes
his own introduction to Sir Mark Sykes to the late Dr. Caster. As future historians
might not unnaturally suppose Dr. Weizmann’s account to be authentic, I have
communicated with Mr. Malcolm, who not only confirms the account I have
given, but holds a letter written to him by Dr. Weizmann on March 5, 1941,
saying: “You will be interested to hear that some time ago I had occasion to
write to Mr. Lloyd George about your useful and timely initiative in 1916 to bring
about the negotiations between myself and my Zionist colleagues and Sir Mark
Sykes and others about Palestine and Zionist support of the allied cause in
America and elsewhere.”

No doubt a complexity of motives lay behind the Balfour Declaration,
including strategic and diplomatic considerations and, on the part of Balfour,
Lloyd George, and Smuts, a genuine sympathy with Zionist aims. But the
determining factor was the intervention of Mr Malcolm with his scheme for
engaging by some such concession the support of American Zionists for the
allied cause in the first world war.
Yours, & c.,

MALCOLM THOMSON
According to Lloyd George’s Memoirs of the Peace Conference, where, as
planned many years before, the Zionists were strongly represented,
There is no better proof of the value of the Balfour Declaration as a military
move than the fact that Germany entered into negotiations with Turkey in an
endeavor to provide an alternative scheme which would appeal to Zionists. A
German-Jewish Society, the V.J.O.D., [A] was formed, and in January 1918, Talaat,
the Turkish Grand Vizier, at the instigation of the Germans, gave vague
promises of legislation by means of which “all justifiable wishes of the Jews in
Palestine would be able to meet their fulfilment.”

Another most cogent reason for the adoption by the Allies of the policy of the
Declaration lay in the state of Russia herself. Russian Jews had been secretly
active on behalf of the Central Powers from the first; they had become the chief
agents of German pacifist propaganda in Russia; by 1917 they had done much in
preparing for that general disintegration of Russian society, later recognised as
the Revolution. It was believed that if Great Britain declared for the fufillment of
Zionist aspirations in Palestine under her own pledge, one effect would be to
bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the Entente.
It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence
upon world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish
financial interests. In America, their aid in this respect would have a special
value when the Allies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable securities
available for American purchases. Such were the chief considerations which, in
1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with
Jewry.[189]

As for getting the support of Russian Jewry, Trotsky’s aims were to
overthrow the Provisional Government and turn the imperialist war into a war of
international revolution. In November 1917 the first aim was accomplished.
Military factors primarily influenced Lenin to sign the peace treaty of
Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

The Zionist sympathizers Churchill and George seemed never to lose an
opportunity to tell the British people that they had an obligation to support the
Zionists.

But what had the Zionists done for Britain?
Where was the documentation?
“Measured by British interests alone,” wrote the Oxford historian Elizabeth
Monroe in 1963, the Balfour Declaration “was one of the greatest mistakes in
our imperial history!”

The Zionists had the Herzlian tradition — shall we call it — of Promises,
“promises.” Considerable credit for the diplomacy which brought into existence
the Jewish national home must go to Weizmann. A British official who came into
contact with him summarized his diplomatic method in the following words:
When (the First World War) began, his cause was hardly known to the principal
statesman of the victors. It had many enemies, and some of the most formidable
were amongst the most highly placed of his own people … He once told me that
2,000 interviews had gone into the making of the Balfour Declaration. With
unerring skill he adapted his arguments to the special circumstances of each
statesman. To the British and Americans he could use biblical language and
awake a deep emotional undertone; to other nationalities he more often talked
in terms of interest. Mr. Lloyd George was told that Palestine was a little
mountainous country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour the philosophical
background of Zionism could be surveyed; for Lord Cecil the problem was
placed in the setting of a new world organization; while to Lord Milner the
extension of imperial power could be vividly portrayed. To me, who dealt with
these matters as a junior officer of the General Staff, he brought from many
sources all the evidences that could be obtained of the importance of a Jewish
national home to the strategical position of the British Empire, but he always
indicated by a hundred shades and inflections of the voice that he believed that
I could also appreciate better than my superiors other more subtle and
recondite arguments.[190]

A) Vereinigung Jüdischer Organisation in Deutschland zur Wahrung der
Rechte des Osten. (Alliance of the Jewish Organizations of Germany for the
Safeguarding of the Rights of the East.)
Triumph and Tragedy
Herzl correctly predicted a great war between the Great Powers. His followers
organized to be ready for that time to further their ambitions through exploiting
the rivalry of the Great Powers. They had a vested interest in promoting that war
and in its continuance until Palestine was wrested from Turkey by British
soldiers.

They prepared for the Peace Conference at Versailles although they had no
belligerent standing, but they had the weight of the Rothschilds, Bernard
Baruch, Felix Frankfurter, and others, which made room for them.
In the Introduction to The Palestine Diary I wrote,
The establishment in 1948 of a “Jewish state” in Palestine was a phenomenal
achievement. In fifty years from the Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, in
1897 — attended by a small number of Jews who represented little more than
themselves — the Zionist idea had captivated the vast majority of world Jewry,
and enlisted in particular Britain, America and the United Nations to intervene in
Palestine in its support.

In 1983, seventy-five years after the Balfour Declaration and nearly ninety
years after the first Zionist Congress in Switzerland a meeting was held there of
the International Conference on the Question of Palestine — but the conferees
were not Jews — they were Palestinians — two million are in exile — displaced by
Jews!

Where is the meaning for us?
On a day-to-day level, we can look in our newspapers for Zionist tactics of
influence and leverage which we can document they have used successfully in
the past.

Then there is a long-term strategy, From the mass of material in a century of
history and in our complex society of today I see the underlying effect of two
themes, They influence the lives of every one of us, and will continue to do so
unless a change is made.

We can see them clearly in their early formulation, before they had been fed
as valid data into the information processing and software systems of our
society, with the result that most of the answers we get are wrong!

They are found in the conversation of Herzl and Meyer-Cohn in 1895. The
sets of ideas are those associated with Jewish nationalism and racism on the
Right [191] — racism being defined by Sir Andrew Huxley P.R.S. as the belief in
the subjugation of one race by another, and on the other hand the concept of
“universalism.”

Acceptance of this input from the Right into our computations has resulted in
the transfer of some $50 billion from our pockets into theirs.[192] In 1983,
budgeted American tax money, labeled “aid,” alone amounts to $625 for every
man, woman and child in Israel.[193] It results in our acceptance of
concentration camps for Palestinians containing thousands of people without a
squeak from the so-called “international community” in acceptance of their
assassination, torture, deportation, closing of their schools and colleges, even
of their massacre.[194] The lives of American troops — men and women, are
committed to supporting these crimes.[195] Criticism is called “antisemitism,” a
word which computes as “unemployable social outcast.”

Jewish nationalism and Israeli policy planned the present destabilization of
Lebanon in 1955.[196] This is part of larger schemes to fragment and enfeeble
possible challenges to their supremacy in the Middle East.[197]
On the other hand we have “universalism.” This, I believe was the factor
motivating Woodrow Wilson through House in his telegram of 30 May 1916 and
letter of 16 June 1915 to the President, to which I have referred. “The League of
Nations,” the United Nations Organization, are its printouts. Just as House was a
coefficient of the international bankers, so the United Nations and the
international bankers have been part of the coefficient whereby over $400
billion of the earnings of workers in countries where universalism is a
significant force, has been transferred to the peoples of Asia, Africa, South
America and Communist countries; money needed for our capital investment.
People should ask: How is it that, with such multiplication of industrial power
and resources, our peoples’ standard of living and possibilities to have and
support children have not multiplied accordingly? Why do so many of our
women have to work? Why does no public figure — politician, labor leader —
dare to ask — and raise the roof?

Universalism and Marxism compete superficially for first place as finalists in
western culture distortion. Both promote its ethnic dilution, but deny us the
reality of racial differences. Against our individuality and our nationalism, they
and the global capitalists and their corporations unite as transnationals to
reduce all but themselves to a common consumer market of blurred boundaries
and one color. They would like one law — which they would make; one armed
force — which they would control. Universalism would impose — not a global
peace, but a global tyranny!

Universalism has come up with “interdependence,” an expression used as a
cover for the expropriation of our earnings as foreign aid in various forms; it
has anesthetized the sense of self-defense of our countries so that those who
have tried to stop their colonization by people from exploding populations of
Africa, Asia and Latin America have been made to feel that they were depriving
others of their “human rights.”

In countries where they live other than Israel, Zionists are in the forefront of
opposition to restrictions on immigration. Note that even in 1903 a leader of the
fight against the Alien’s Bill and against tightening up naturalization regulations
in Britain was the pro-Zionist Winston S. Churchill, and the super-Zionist Herzl
appeared before the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration to oppose any
restriction.

And yet, my Arab friends born in Jerusalem are cast out and cannot return.
“If,” said Herzl, “we wanted to bring about the unity of mankind independent of
national boundaries, we would have to combat the ideal of patriotism. The latter,
however, will prove stronger than we for innumerable years to come.
In a hundred years they have almost won that struggle.
In a conversation with Joseph Chamberlain in 1903, Theodore Herzl was asked
how the Jewish colony would survive in the distant future. Herzl said, “We shall
play the role of a small buffer state. We shall attain this not through the goodwill
but from the jealousy of the Powers.”

This is the game that Israel plays today, obtaining its military supplies, its
high technology, and its billions of dollars from the pay packets of American
workers, using the rivalry of the USSR and the U.S.A.
We should not allow ourselves to be made pawns in the games of others.

Appendix
SECRET
Political Intelligence Department,
Foreign Office.
Special 3.
Memorandum on British Commitments to King Husein
(Page 9) With regard to Palestine, His Majesty’s Government are committed by
Sir H. McMahon’s letter to the Sherif on the 24th October, 1915, to its inclusion
in the boundaries of Arab independence. But they have stated their policy
regarding the Palestinian Holy Places and Zionist colonisation in their message
to him of the 4th January, 1918:

“That so far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people
shall be subjected to another, but that in view of the fact:

“(a.) That there are in Palestine shrines, Wakfs, and Holy Places, sacred in
some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in others
to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are of interest to vast masses
of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special regime to deal
with these places approved of by the world.

“(b.) That as regards the Mosque of Omar, it shall be considered as a Moslem
concern alone, and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any
non-Moslem authority.

“That since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to
Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and
further, as His Majesty’s Government view with favour the realisation of this
aspiration. His Majesty’s Government are determined that in so far as is
compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and
political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal.”
This message was delivered personally to King Husein by Commander Hogarth,
and the lattcr reported on his reception of it as follows:

“The King would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor
was I instructed to warn him that such a State was contemplated by Great Britain.
He probably knows nothing of the actual or possible economy of Palestine, and
his ready assent to Jewish settlement there is not worth very much. But I think
he appreciates the financial advantage of Arab co-operation with the Jews.”

Notes

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